Solicitors' Will-Making Duties by Mortensen, R. G.
—M.U.L.R- Mortensen_finalproof3 —Solicitors’ Will-Making Duties—printed
 
04/26/02 at 12:42 PM — page 60 of 28
60
SOLICITORS’ WILL-MAKING DUTIES
REID MORTENSEN *
[Since the recognition that, in will-making practice, solicitors owe duties to beneficiaries as well as
to clients, the courts have stated solicitors’ will-making duties with some precision. However, the law
of tort still fails to offer an agreed rationale for them. This article suggests that, tortious principles
aside, these duties spring from a clearer articulation of the solicitor’s professional role as caretaker
of clients’ testamentary intentions. This idea explains most adjudication on will-making, while
placing reasonably clear limits on solicitors’ liabilities. This article’s theory of the solicitor’s
caretaking role is the basis of its criticism of Queensland Art Gallery Board of Trustees v Henderson
Trout (a firm) — where duties to one who merely hoped to be a beneficiary were recognised — and
its conclusion that the duties stated there are conceptually precarious and practically unsustainable.]
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PISCATOR: And now I have a bite at another. Oh me! he has broke all; there’s
half a line and a good hook lost.
VENATOR: Aye, and a good Trout too.
PISCATOR: Nay, the Trout is not lost; for pray take notice, no man can lose
what he never had.1
* BCom (Hons), LLB (Hons), PhD (Qld); Senior Lecturer, T C Beirne School of Law, University
of Queensland; Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Queensland. Thanks are given to the Hon C W
Pincus QC and Karen Schultz for critiquing early drafts of this article. The author practised in
the Corporate and Commercial Section of Henderson Trout between 1988–90.
1 Izaak Walton, The Compleat Angler (first published 1653, 1921 ed) 108.
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I  INTRODUCTION
The solicitor’s traditional practice of will-making was the platform for the
expansion of lawyers’ tortious liability during the 1990s. Lawyers have been as
ready as other professionals to preach jeremiads about exposure to civil liability,2
but since at least 1988, when Hawkins v Clayton3 was decided, they have been
right to believe that larger duties have been recognised in this area. The inevita-
ble corollary is that there has been a rise in the number of claims — merited or
otherwise — against solicitors over their will-making practices.4
For the most part, these will-making duties have been supported by a judicial
perception that, without them, the law is incapable of meeting widely recognised
demands of justice. Furthermore, although these duties translate into higher
insurance premiums for solicitors and higher fees for clients,5 it is possible to
discharge them by inexpensive procedures that were used in law firms before
1988. In this article, I first consider the different duties that courts have articu-
lated for a solicitor’s will-making practice. Secondly, I suggest that, despite
considerable theoretical incoherence in the genealogy of these duties, they can be
reconciled and resolved by developing the idea that they rest on the solicitor’s
‘custodianship of the testatrix’s testamentary intentions’.6 To that extent, I argue
that the large number of cases that have been decided in the field spring from a
principled understanding of the solicitor’s professional role. Thirdly, this
demands discussion of the recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in
Queensland Art Gallery Board of Trustees v Henderson Trout (a firm),7 which is
difficult to reconcile with this role. Henderson Trout II once more enlarges
solicitors’ duties of care in will-making practice but in doing so, I suggest, it
perforates limits of liability that had developed in the field. In conclusion, I
reinforce this argument by showing that, unlike the other will-making cases,
Henderson Trout II leaves solicitors with unreasonable burdens in practice
management if the duties it states are to be properly discharged in similar
circumstances.
II   DUTIES  IN  WILL-MAKING PRACTICE
The recognised duties of a solicitor in will-making practice are owed princi-
pally to the client testator. While the question of owing duties to others (usually
the client’s beneficiaries) has been raised, it received short shrift until the 1950s.
2 See, eg, Trevor Aldridge, ‘Is This Serious?’ (1995) 139 Solicitors Journal 206; Stephen Warne,
‘Legal Professional Liability — Part 1’ (2000) 8 Torts Law Journal 283, 284–5.
3 (1988) 164 CLR 539 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ) (‘Hawkins II’).
4 ‘Wills Case Effect on Claims “Not Dramatic”’ (1995) 139 Solicitors Journal 156; Brian Bartley,
‘The Widow’s Legacy’, APPIIL Newsletter (Brisbane), July 2000, 7, 8.
5 Christopher Wallworth, ‘Will Drafting: A Job for the Specialist?’ (1994) 138 Solicitors Journal
1040; Des Butler, ‘A New Liability for Solicitors, A Fresh Approach for Negligence’ (1998) 18
Queensland Lawyer 151, 154; Geraldine Gray, ‘The Changing Face of Legal Practice and Impli-
cations for Professional Indemnity Insurance’ (1999) 11 Insurance Law Journal 74, 79; Haw-
kins v Clayton (1986) 5 NSWLR 109, 138–9 (‘Hawkins I’).
6 Hawkins II (1988) 164 CLR 539, 545 (emphasis in original).
7 [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J, 24 March 2000) (‘Henderson
Trout II’).
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The principle that a disappointed legatee has no action against a lawyer whose
negligence caused the loss was stated in Robertson v Fleming,8 a Scottish case
that predated the modern law of negligence but controlled the position in the
Commonwealth and parts of the United States.9 Since the California courts first
recognised third party liability in a will-making case in 1958,10 the strong trend
has been for common law courts to extend liability to beneficiaries and execu-
tors. From that time, Robertson v Fleming has only been followed, perhaps
reasonably, in Scotland11 and, more strangely, in Victoria.12 The New York and
Texas courts still maintain a similar rule that attorneys are only liable in negli-
gence to clients,13 and in Florida third party liability is significantly more limited
than in the Commonwealth.14 These cases aside, adjudication over the last 50
years has seen duties in will-making practice stated in the following five more
specific contexts:15
• a duty to prepare a will;
• a duty to ensure that the will gives legal effect to the testator’s instructions;
• a duty to ensure that a will is validly executed and attested;
• a duty to advise against accidental revocation; and
• custodial duties.
Excepting custodial duties, the duties specified have arisen under the usual
retainer to prepare a legally effective will. Although, as will be seen, the specific
duties show that there are more profound implications to the usual retainer, it
8 (1861) 4 Macq 167, 177, 184–5, 199–200.
9 Ward v Lewis (1896) 22 VLR 410, 418; Buckley v Gray, 42 P 900, 900–1 (Cal, 1895) (‘Buck-
ley’); Re Solicitor; Ex parte Fitzpatrick [1924] 1 DLR 981, 983, 984–5; Mickel v Murphy, 305 P
2d 993 (Cal, 1957) (‘Mickel’). For discussion of the US position, see Joan Teshima, ‘What
Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other than Immediate
Client’ (1984) 61 ALR4th 464, 483–601.
10 Biakanja v Irving, 320 P 2d 16 (Cal, 1958) (‘Biakanja’).
11 Weir v J M Hodge & Son [1990] SLT 266, 270 (‘Weir’); MacDougall v MacDougall’s Executors
[1994] SLT 1178, 1184 (‘MacDougall’).
12 Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193, 243–4 (‘Seale’). See Harold Luntz, ‘Solicitors’ Liability to Third
Parties’ (1983) 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 284, 285; Gerry Bates, ‘Liability of Solicitors
for Negligence to Beneficiaries under a Will’ (1985) 59 Australian Law Journal 327, 333–4.
13 Kramer v Belfi, 482 NYS 2d 898, 899–900 (Sup Ct App Div 2d Dept, 1984) (‘Kramer’);
Viscardi v Lerner, 510 NYS 2d 183, 185 (Sup Ct App Div 2d Dept, 1986) (‘Viscardi’);
Spivey v Pulley, 526 NYS 2d 145, 146–7 (Sup Ct App Div 2d Dept, 1988) (‘Spivey’); Mali v De
Forest & Duer, 553 NYS 2d 391, 392 (Sup Ct App Div 1st Dept, 1990) (‘Mali’);
Deeb v Johnson, 566 NYS 2d 688 (Sup Ct App Div 3d Dept, 1991) (‘Deeb’); Berry v Dodson,
Nunley & Taylor, 717 SW 2d 716, 718 (Tex Ct App, 1986) (‘Berry’); Barcelo v Elliott, 923 SW
2d 575, 578–9 (Tex, 1996) (‘Barcelo’); Gamboa v Shaw, 956 SW 2d 662, 664 (Tex 4th Dist Ct
App, 1997). Australian commentators have sometimes mistaken the position in New York:
Martin Vranken, ‘Negligent Solicitors and Compensation for Economic Loss: Hill v Van Erp’
(1997) 5 Torts Law Journal 1, 2; Butler, above n 5, 152.
14 De Maris v Asti, 426 So 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1983) (‘De Maris’);
Lorraine v Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber Co, 467 So 2d 315, 318 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App,
1985) (‘Lorraine’); Rosenstone v Satchell, 560 So 2d 1229, 1229–30 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1990)
(‘Rosenstone’); Espinosa v Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronner (a firm), 612 So 2d
1378, 1380 (Fla, 1993) (‘Espinosa’); Babcock v Malone, 760 So 2d 1056, 1056 (Fla 4th Dist Ct
App, 2000) (‘Babcock’).
15 See Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility in Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed,
2001) 118–24; Law Book Company, Laws of Australia, vol 27 (at 1 April 2002) 27 Professional
Liability, ‘27.3 Solicitors’ [47]; Ysaiah Ross, Ethics in Law: Lawyers’ Responsibility and Ac-
countability in Australia (3rd ed, 2001) 283–90.
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inevitably requires the proper drawing up and execution of the will. However, on
occasion, circumstances can demand a more limited retainer. In Smolin-
ski v Mitchell,16 the solicitor was asked to prepare a will that was to include
himself as a beneficiary of the estate. The solicitor, rightly, advised the testator to
obtain independent legal advice and recommended another solicitor who could
give it. Accordingly, the first solicitor’s retainer was only to prepare the first
draft of the will. The duty to advise on the content and effect of the will and to
arrange execution would, if the testator had lived long enough to seek a second
opinion, have belonged to the other solicitor. The defendant solicitor was held
not to owe any duty of care to another of the testator’s intended beneficiaries,
and was not liable for failing to arrange execution before the testator died.17
Therefore, for wills, as for other aspects of practice, the duties arising under any
retainer depend on the circumstances. The custodial duties will arise when the
client asks that the solicitors hold the will in their safe-custody facility, and the
solicitors agree to do so.
A  Preparing a Will
Decisions concerning a client’s instructions to prepare a will and the solicitor’s
failure to do so before the client’s death are conceptually and evidentially the
most contentious. A will should be prepared if the instructing client has testa-
mentary capacity. That is normally assumed, but a medical opinion should be
obtained if there are reasons to doubt that the client has the requisite capacity.18
Where the medical practitioner believes the client lacks capacity, the client
should be advised. The solicitor will still be obliged to prepare a will if an
incapacitated, but relatively coherent, client insists it be prepared;19 although it is
likely that the solicitor could not be held liable to beneficiaries of that will if a
court later refused to grant it probate on the ground of incapacity.20
It has been suggested that the only difference between these ‘failure to pre-
pare’ cases and those dealing with defective execution is the type of failure, and
not the analysis of the duty.21 There are nevertheless other differences, all
relating to the evidence of testamentary intention. The cases raise several
questions. First, whether there was a breach of duty in not preparing the will in
the unknown time between receiving the instructions and the client’s death.
Second, whether those instructions reflected the testator’s real intention for the
property at the time he or she died.22 That raises a third question, less frequently
canvassed, which is the cogency of the evidence used to establish this intention.
Testamentary intention in these cases is identified by evidence other than the
16 [1995] 10 WWR 68 (‘Smolinski’).
17 Ibid 88–91.
18 Ryan v Public Trustee [2000] 1 NZLR 700, 719 (‘Ryan’); Public Trustee v Till [2001] 2 NZLR
508, 515–16 (‘Till’).
19 Till [2001] 2 NZLR 508, 515.
20 This follows if the solicitor’s duties to beneficiaries are held to depend on the testator’s
intentions, as a person lacking capacity could not be held to have formed an intention which the
law is capable of recognising.
21 Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1983] NZLR 37, 52 (‘Gartside’).
22 Cf Smolinski [1995] 10 WWR 68, 91.
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law’s preferred means of proof — that is, through an executed will.23
White v Jones,24 the leading English decision on solicitors’ duties to beneficiar-
ies, is close to the outer perimeter of this third question.25 There, the 78 year old
testator had sent his solicitors a letter instructing them to prepare a will that
reinstated his daughters as legatees. The reinstatement had not occurred when the
testator died, unexpectedly, just under two months later. An earlier will by which
the testator had cut his daughters out of his estate was proved instead. The House
of Lords nevertheless held, by a majority,26 that the solicitors owed the daugh-
ters, as the testator’s intended legatees, a duty ‘to act with due expedition and
care’ in relation to the preparation of an effective will.27 Less time was spent
discussing the question of negligence, but the majority was satisfied that the
solicitors had, by omission, been in breach of their duty.
From other cases it appears that the duty to prepare a will expeditiously arises
merely because the testator’s intention is made evident to the instructed solicitor.
The issue of how expeditiously the will should be prepared is again a situational
duty, depending on ‘age or health or other circumstances affecting the client’.28
If it is necessary that a question of testamentary capacity be answered, that an
inventory of the estate be taken, or that legal ambiguities in the status of property
be resolved, the period within which the will should be prepared should be
longer.29 Short time-lines could be expected where instructions are received from
an octogenarian testatrix,30 from military or naval personnel on active service,31
from a person whose health is evidently failing,32 or from a patient in an inten-
sive care unit.33 Immediate attention is expected on a deathbed visit. In Sum-
merville v Walsh,34 the New South Wales Court of Appeal accepted that there
was negligence in a solicitor’s failure to complete an effective will after receiv-
ing instructions in hospital from a dying client. The negligence in Summerville
was not undue delay, but the solicitor’s ignorance of the law35 in allowing the
23 Garcia v Borelli, 180 Cal Rptr 768, 771 (1st Dist Ct App 3d Div, 1982) (‘Garcia’); Barcelo, 923
SW 2d 575, 581 (Tex, 1996) (Cornyn and Abbott JJ dissenting).
24 [1995] 2 AC 207 (‘White’).
25 In Australia, doubts were cast on the authority of White in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159,
208 (‘Van Erp II’), and at first instance in Queensland Art Gallery Board of Trus-
tees v Henderson Trout (a firm) [1998] QSC 250 (Unreported, Chesterman J, 10 November
1998) [126] (‘Henderson Trout I’). Greg Mann implies that the law in Australia would not ex-
tend to the White scenario: ‘Lady Trout and the Fine Art of Testamentary Reluctance’ (1999) 19
Proctor 14, 15. White was accepted by Pincus JA in Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unre-
ported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J, 24 March 2000) [30].
26 Lords Goff, Browne-Wilkinson and Nolan; Lords Keith and Mustill dissenting.
27 White [1995] 2 AC 207, 276.
28 Gartside [1983] NZLR 37, 46. See also Smolinski [1995] 10 WWR 68, 72, 89; Carr-
Glynn v Frearsons (a firm) [1999] Ch 326, 331 (‘Carr-Glynn II’).
29 Espinosa, 612 So 2d 1378, 1379 (Fla, 1993); Ryan [2000] 1 NZLR 700, 718.
30 Gartside [1983] NZLR 37, reversing Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1981] 2 NZLR 547;
Carr-Glynn II [1999] Ch 326, 331, 338.
31 Otter v Church, Adams, Tatham & Co [1953] 1 Ch 280, 286 (‘Otter’).
32 Babcock, 760 So 2d 1056, 1056 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 2000).
33 Cf Berry, 717 SW 2d 716, 717 (Tex Ct App,1986).
34 [1998] NSWSC 52 (Unreported, Mason P, Sheller and Beazley JJA, 26 February 1998)
(‘Summerville’).
35 Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 7.
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client, who had received fatal burns and was unable to write, to direct another
person to sign the will on his behalf. The solicitor himself signed a statement,
witnessed by the hospital receptionist, as to the client’s intention to leave all of
his property to a girlfriend. That was refused probate, but the solicitor was still
held to be liable to the girlfriend who was denied any interest in the estate.
The cases dealing with a solicitor’s failure to prepare a will should be distin-
guished from those in which a will has been executed, but where the beneficiar-
ies are disappointed because the will is refused probate on the ground that its
execution was faulty. The evidential problems in establishing liability are greater
in the ‘failure to prepare’ cases because the testator’s intentions may have
changed before the will was executed.36 Furthermore, as in White and Sum-
merville, evidence must be sufficiently clear for a court to accept that the will on
which probate was granted does not reflect the testator’s real intentions for the
property at the time of death. For this reason, in Florida, while duties to benefici-
aries to avoid accidental revocation37 and presumably to ensure valid execution
are recognised,38 there is no recognised duty to beneficiaries to prepare a will.
Liability to a beneficiary will only arise if ‘the testamentary intent, as expressed
in a will, is frustrated’.39 The Florida courts have held that
[t]here is no authority … for the proposition that a disappointed beneficiary
may prove, by evidence totally extrinsic to the will, [that] the testator’s testa-
mentary intention was other than as expressed in his solemn and properly exe-
cuted will.40
The Florida approach is without parallel elsewhere in the common law world.
Those courts in the Commonwealth and in other parts of the United States that
do recognise that lawyers owe a duty of care to beneficiaries are cautious about
using extrinsic evidence but, regardless, will ultimately give priority to the
testator’s proven intentions for the property.41
B  Giving Legal Effect to the Testator’s Instructions
In drawing up a will, a solicitor is under some obligation to ensure that the will
gives legal effect to the testator’s instructions for the property. The duty requires
the solicitor to interview the client carefully and to ascertain fully the client’s
intentions for the property.42 It then demands that the solicitor reach a sound
36 White [1995] 2 AC 207, 219; Smolinski [1995] 10 WWR 68, 90–1; Cancer Research Cam-
paign v Ernest Brown & Co (a firm) (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Harman J,
27 October 1997) (‘Cancer Research Campaign’).
37 McAbee v Edwards, 340 So 2d 1167 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1976) (‘McAbee’).
38 Ibid 1169, citing Biakanja, 320 P 2d 16 (Cal, 1958).
39 De Maris, 426 So 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1983) (emphasis in original).
40 Ibid. See also Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 318 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985); Espinosa, 612 So 2d
1378, 1380 (Fla, 1993); National Union Fire Insurance Co v Salter, 717 So 2d 141, 142 (Fla 5th
Dist Ct App, 1998) (‘Salter’); Babcock, 760 So 2d 1056, 1057 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 2000);
Bates, above n 12, 336.
41 Cf Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 321 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985); Barcelo, 923 SW 2d 575, 581
(Tex, 1996) (Cornyn and Abbott JJ dissenting).
42 Gibbons v Nelsons (a firm) (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Blackburne J,
5 April 2000) 6–7 (‘Gibbons’).
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legal assessment of the status of the property, that they consider whether the
testator is the beneficial owner of the property (and not just a trustee)43 and,
where possible, that they ensure that the property can be dealt with as the client
wishes.44 So, if the property is subject to restraints on alienation, the solicitor
must take measures that enable it to be disentailed.45 An estate plan that requires
the division of property to beneficiaries through an inter vivos trust requires a
valid trust to be settled first.46 For example, in Carr-Glynn II,47 the testatrix
wanted to leave an interest in land to her niece, but held the land as a joint tenant
with her nephew. On the testatrix’s death, the land passed by survivorship to the
nephew. The Court of Appeal held that, as severance of the joint tenancy was
required as part of the will-making process, the solicitors were liable to the niece
for failing to arrange it.48 The will-making retainer might also include a duty to
advise the testator and beneficiaries of the tax implications of any gift made in
the will, but this would seem not to extend to the giving of tax advice over the
whole estate and as to all possible entitlements the testator might have.49 In
Australia, where tax advice is more usually given by accountants, any indication
that the estate requires careful tax planning should prompt the solicitor to consult
an accountant or an expert tax lawyer.50 If the property is completely incapable
of testamentary disposition, no duty could be owed to a person who hoped to
receive it under a will.51 However, the lawyer might have to advise the testator
that the property cannot be given by will, and should not allow the will to imply,
by expressly including it as a testamentary gift, that it can be so given.52
As in other areas of practice, solicitors are also expected to draft a will in terms
that ensure it would realise the client’s instructions. In Ogle v Fuiten,53 it was
alleged that the attorneys had not followed instructions given by a couple who
wanted their mutual wills to provide that, if they died within 30 days of each
other, their nephews would be the sole beneficiaries of their estates. The couple
died 15 days apart, but, as the wills provided that the nephews were only to
receive the estate if the couple died ‘in or from a common disaster’, the property
43 Earl v Wilhelm [1998] 2 WWR 522, 529 (‘Earl’).
44 Carr-Glynn v Frearsons (a firm) [1997] 2 All ER 614, 621–2 (‘Carr-Glynn I’).
45 Otter [1953] 1 Ch 280, 287.
46 Cf Barcelo, 923 SW 2d 575, 577–8 (Tex, 1996).
47 [1999] Ch 326.
48 Ibid 332, 336. See also Garcia, 180 Cal Rptr 768, 770 (1st Dist Ct App 3d Div, 1982); Kecske-
meti v Rubins Rabin & Co [1992] TLR 666 (‘Kecskemeti’). Cf the decision at first instance in
Carr-Glynn I [1997] 2 All ER 614, 628–30, where Lloyd J considered that the solicitors’ duties
were satisfied on advising the testatrix on the implications of different kinds of joint ownership.
See Amanda Stickley, ‘Consequences if an Intended Beneficiary Is Cut out of a Will: Potential
Liability if Unilateral Severance Is Not Fast Enough’ (2000) 20 Queensland Lawyer 207.
49 Cancer Research Campaign (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Harman J, 27
October 1997). Cf Punford v Gilberts Accountants (a firm) [1999] ECC 91, 95 (‘Punford’);
Mali, 553 NYS 2d 391, 392 (Sup Ct App Div 1st Dept, 1990); Kramer, 482 NYS 2d 898, 900
(Sup Ct App Div 2d Dept, 1984); Deeb, 566 NYS 2d 688, 689 (Sup Ct App Div 3d Dept, 1991);
John Murphy, ‘Probate Solicitors, Disappointed Beneficiaries and the Tortious Duty to Advise
on Tax Avoidance’ (1998) 14 Professional Negligence 107.
50 For the situation in Canada, see Earl [1998] 2 WWR 522, 539.
51 Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 319 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985).
52 Ibid 317.
53 466 NE 2d 224 (Ill, 1984) (‘Ogle’).
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was divided amongst other relations under intestacy rules. The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that, if these allegations were proved, the nephews had a valid claim
against the attorneys.54
For the most part however, claims of a solicitor’s non-compliance with in-
structions have failed because the lawyers were simply found to have imple-
mented the client’s instructions. There have been cases where claimants had no
evidence that the testator intended to leave them property in the will.55 In one of
these, Ventura County Humane Society,56 the California Court of Appeal seemed
to accept that the testator intended that a residuary beneficiary be described in
ambiguous terms, which were then included in the will. Imprecise drafting by the
attorney therefore discharged his duties.57 In Walker v Geo H Medlicott & Son (a
firm),58 it appeared that the testatrix truly intended to leave her house to her
nephew and that that intention remained stable from the time the will was
prepared and executed until the time of her death. However, on balance, it
appeared that she did not actually instruct the solicitor that the nephew was to
have the house and, for that reason, the UK Court of Appeal held that the
nephew’s claim had to fail. There was a genuine misunderstanding between the
testatrix and the solicitor, the latter having the impression that the nephew was to
be only a residuary beneficiary. The Court stated: ‘It may well be that the
testatrix unwittingly gave [the solicitor] the reasonable impression of intending
one thing, while in truth intending another.’59
There have certainly been cases of failing to give legal effect to the client’s
instructions in the language of the will. For example, in Lucas v Hamm,60
liability was still denied where a legacy was void because, by the terms of the
will, it could possibly have vested after the perpetuity period expired. The
Supreme Court of California believed that the errant attorney could not be
expected to have known the requirements of the rule against perpetuities.61 That
may be setting the standard too low,62 but where the drafting error is proved to be
negligent, the claim in tort may not be the appropriate means of redress. In
Walker, the Court held that the disappointed beneficiary should seek rectification
of the will before an action in tort could be considered.63 The traditional equita-
ble claim for rectification is usually unsuitable for this purpose, as it only allows
deletion of words incorrectly inserted in the will.64 There might be cases where a
54 Ibid 227. See also Palmros v Barcelona, 672 NE 2d 1245 (Ill App Ct 2d Dist, 1996) (‘Palmros’).
55 Ventura County Humane Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and Animals
Inc v Holloway, 115 Cal Rptr 464, 470 (1st Dist Ct App, 1974) (‘Ventura County Humane Soci-
ety’); Sutherland v Public Trustee [1980] 2 NZLR 536 (‘Sutherland’); Weir [1990] SLT 266;
Gibbons (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Blackburne J, 5 April 2000).
56 115 Cal Rptr 464, 470 (1st DCA, 1974).
57 Ibid.
58 [1999] 1 WLR 727 (‘Walker’).
59 Ibid 738, 741; cf the allegation of negligent drafting in Kramer, 482 NYS 2d 898, 900 (Sup Ct
App Div 2d Dept, 1984).
60 364 P 2d 685 (Cal, 1961) (‘Lucas I’).
61 Ibid 690.
62 Robert Megarry, ‘Note’ (1965) 81 Law Quarterly Review 478, 481.
63 [1999] 1 WLR 729, 739, 742.
64 Re Morris [1971] P 62, 75.
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residuary beneficiary is deprived of an intended benefit because a specific gift is
incorrectly included in a will,65 but more often the problem is a failure to include
a disposition that would have given effect to the testator’s instructions.66
Legislative reforms now often allow rectification of a will by inserting words
that were incorrectly omitted.67 Where this remedy is available, Walker suggests
that the plaintiff’s general duty in tort to take steps to mitigate loss requires that
the disappointed beneficiary bring proceedings for rectification before suing the
solicitor in tort.68 This is an important practical point, as proceedings for
rectification must be brought within six months to two years from the grant of
probate, a period much shorter than the normal limitation period in tort of six
years from the time of death.69
C  Valid Execution and Attestation
The most adjudicated area of will-making practice involves cases of ‘defective
execution’.70 Here the solicitor has prepared a will that the testator has accepted
and signed. The will nevertheless fails in whole or in part, whether because the
execution was incorrect,71 a witness was absent,72 or the witnessing by a
beneficiary or a beneficiary’s spouse means that the beneficiary is not entitled to
receive the gift.73 The will may also fail because the solicitors did not ensure that
the testator intended it to take effect at the time it was signed, despite wanting it
to be operative at some future point.74 This situation differs from that of Smolin-
ski75 and the ‘duty to prepare’ cases, as here testamentary intention is proved in
the preferred manner — an executed will. A technical error, casting no doubt on
the nature of the testator’s intention, nevertheless means that the will cannot be
given effect by the law of succession. Instead, the recognition of a solicitor’s
duty to the disappointed beneficiary means that, so far as that beneficiary is
65 See, eg, Viscardi, 510 NYS 2d 183 (Sup Ct App Div 2d Dept, 1986).
66 See, eg, Buckley, 42 P 900 (Cal, 1895); Walker [1999] 1 WLR 727.
67 Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 12A; Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 29A;
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 31; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 25AA; Wills Act 1992 (Tas) s 47; Wills
Act 1997 (Vic) s 31. Walker [1999] 1 WLR 727 dealt with the Administration of Justice Act 1982
(UK) c 53, s 20.
68 [1999] 1 WLR 729, 739, 742. See, eg, Garcia, 180 Cal Rptr 768 (1st Dist Ct App 3d Div, 1982).
Cf Pilkington v Wood [1953] 1 Ch 771, 776–7.
69 Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 12A; Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 29A;
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 31; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 25AA; Wills Act 1992 (Tas) s 47; Wills
Act 1997 (Vic) s 31. See Ken Mackie and Mark Burton, Outline of Succession (2nd ed, 2000) 59–
64.
70 Gartside [1983] NZLR 37, 44.
71 Biakanja, 320 P 2d 16 (Cal, 1958); Seale [1982] VR 193.
72 Mickel, 305 P 2d 993 (Cal, 1957); MacDougall [1994] SLT 1178.
73 See, eg, Buckley, 42 P 900 (Cal, 1895); Whittingham v Crease & Co (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 353
(‘Whittingham’); Ross v Caunters [1980] 1 Ch 297 (‘Ross’); Watts v Public Trustee for Western
Australia [1980] WAR 97 (‘Watts’); Van Erp v Hill [1995] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-317 (‘Van
Erp I’); Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159.
74 Corbett v Newey [1999] EWCA 1379 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Morritt, Auld and
Clarke LJJ, 30 March 1999) (‘Corbett I’); Corbett v Bond Pearce (a firm) [2000] Lloyd’s Rep
805 (‘Corbett II’); Corbett v Bond Pearce (a firm) [2001] 3 All ER 769, 772, 773 (‘Corbett III’).
75 [1995] 10 WWR 68.
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concerned, the testator’s intention is given some effect through the law of
negligence.
California led this development when its courts held that a notary illegally
undertaking attorneys’ work was liable to a disappointed beneficiary where the
will failed through incorrect witnessing.76 In the Commonwealth, the duty to a
beneficiary to ensure valid execution and attestation was first endorsed in the
British Columbia decision of Whittingham,77 which was followed in England in
Ross.78 In both Whittingham and Ross, the gift to the beneficiary failed because
the beneficiary’s spouse witnessed the execution of the will. Megarry V-C’s
decision in Ross was eventually accepted by the House of Lords in White,79
where damages were awarded despite weaker evidence of testamentary inten-
tion.80
Similar duties to ensure proper execution were recognised when the question
was litigated in Western Australia81 and Queensland,82 but not in Victoria.83
When the Queensland case Van Erp II  reached the High Court of Australia, a
large majority84 endorsed the duties stated in Whittingham, Ross and White.
There was no majority opinion as to why the duties should arise. The solicitor
had admitted her negligence provided that duties had been owed to the benefici-
ary, so there was little demand for the judges to give content to them.85 However,
Brennan CJ held in broad terms that ‘[b]y accepting the testator’s retainer, the
solicitor enters upon the task of effecting compliance with the formalities
necessary to transfer property from a testator on death to an intended benefici-
ary’.86
The dissenting judge, McHugh J, cast the duty in terms more specific to the
case, imposing ‘a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the will is not
witnessed by a spouse of the beneficiary in jurisdictions where this may result in
the beneficiary forfeiting the gift.’87 Van Erp II, dealing as it does with the
conceptual problems of holding a solicitor liable to a non-client, sets the Austra-
lian paradigm for solicitors’ duties in will-making practice generally. It is
considered in greater depth below.
76 Biakanja, 320 P 2d 16 (Cal, 1958).
77 (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 353.
78 [1980] 1 Ch 297, 314. See also Peter Cane, ‘Negligent Solicitors and Disappointed Beneficiar-
ies’ (1980) 96 Law Quarterly Review 182.
79 [1995] 2 AC 207, 226, 233, 238, 259–62, 293; cf 282–3. See also Kecskemeti [1992] TLR 666.
80 See above nn 24–7 and accompanying text.
81 Watts [1980] WAR 97.
82 Van Erp I [1995] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-317; see also Finlay v Rowlands, Anderson and Hine
[1987] Tas R 60, 63–4.
83 Seale [1982] VR 193; Peter Cane, ‘Negligent Solicitors and Doubly Disappointed Beneficiaries’
(1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review 346.
84 (1997) 188 CLR 159 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ; McHugh J
dissenting).
85 Ibid 172, 191–2 (Gaudron J), 200–1 (McHugh J), 219 (Gummow J).
86 Ibid 170. See also at 187 (Dawson J).
87 Ibid 200. See also at 199.
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D  Accidental Revocation
Somewhat analogous to the duties relating to execution and attestation is a
possible duty to advise against the accidental revocation of a will. If it exists, this
duty arises only where statute provides that a will is revoked, in whole or part, on
the marriage of the testator unless the will is expressly made in contemplation of
that particular marriage. In the specific circumstances of Hall v Meyrick,88
Ashworth J held that a solicitor was bound by this duty after the solicitor learned
from Hall (the client testator) in an interview that he was planning to marry his
housekeeper Sheela James. The duty was to advise that, if the marriage took
place, the will the solicitor was instructed to prepare would be revoked.89 The
couple had consulted the solicitor together in 1949, instructing him to prepare
mutual wills. That led to differing interpretations as to whether there was a joint
retainer, and as to whether James was advised as both testatrix and beneficiary of
Hall’s estate.90 The couple married 10 months later but, although James con-
sulted the solicitor again about a new will for herself in June 1952, Hall made no
new will before his death in September 1952. James received part of Hall’s estate
under intestacy rules, but less than she would have received under the 1949 will.
Her claim failed because the Court of Appeal regarded her retention of the
solicitor as independent of Hall’s, and her claim in contract was time-barred.
However, Ashworth J held that the duty to advise about the effects of marriage
on a will only arose because, during the interview in 1949, the possibility of
marriage had been mentioned. On appeal, Hodson and Ormerod LJJ also
supported the solicitor’s duty to advise about the effects of marriage once the
solicitor learned that the couple was considering marriage. Their Lordships did
not believe that, in other will-making cases, the solicitor would necessarily have
that same obligation.91 Hall therefore suggests that it is a precondition to the
duty to advise about automatic revocation that the solicitor is told that there is a
possibility of marriage. However, with the recognition of tortious liability to
beneficiaries, the need for this precondition must be in doubt.
In the later California case of Heyer v Flaig,92 and the almost identical Florida
case of McAbee,93 the accidental revocation of part of a will by the subsequent
marriage of a testatrix was held to make the attorney liable to the residuary
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were deprived of the portion of the estate that
was allocated to the husband under intestacy rules because the marriage revoked
the will as against the spouse.94 So far as the duty to the beneficiary is con-
cerned, the circumstances of Hall, Heyer and McAbee are difficult to distinguish
from Van Erp II. The testator’s intention to benefit the disappointed beneficiary
88 [1957] 2 QB 455 (‘Hall’).
89 Ibid 467. No doubt the duty would also be discharged if the solicitor advised the client to make
the will in contemplation of the marriage.
90 Ibid 467, 481. Cf Rosenstone, 560 So 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1990).
91 Hall [1957] 2 QB 455, 455, 475–6, 482.
92 74 Cal Rptr 225 (Cal, 1969) (‘Heyer’).
93 340 So 2d 1167 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1976).
94 The spouse therefore took the portion allocated to spouses by intestacy rules, and the balance of
the estate only was distributed in accordance with the will: Heyer, 74 Cal Rptr 225, 226 (Cal,
1969); McAbee, 340 So 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1976).
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is also established by a will, not by some extrinsic evidence that would displace
the intention expressed in an earlier will. The will is also only invalid because it
is unwittingly revoked, but as in Van Erp II the law of succession does nothing to
undermine the strong evidence of the particular intention presented by the will.
E  Custodial Duties
There are a number of duties that arise only when the solicitor has been re-
tained to hold the client’s will in safe custody, and which arise on the client’s
death. The High Court of Australia articulated these duties in Hawkins II.95
There, the testatrix’s will had been made in 1971 but, despite her asking that it be
returned to her, the solicitors kept it in safe custody. When the testatrix died in
1975, the solicitors dealt with her nephew and with another relative, arranged for
the bank to pay her funeral expenses, and inspected a safe-custody packet.
However, it was not until 1981 that the solicitors contacted Hawkins, the
executor and primary beneficiary of the estate. Until then, he was unaware of his
appointment as executor and his beneficial interest. This delay led to financial
loss: a house had fallen into disrepair; and penalties were imposed for the late
lodgement of a death duty return. Hawkins sought to recover the loss by an
action against the solicitors in 1982. His claim as executor was brought in
contract and tort, and, as beneficiary, in tort alone.96 The High Court, by a
majority,97 held that the duties were owed to Hawkins as executor. The Court
therefore recognised a duty of care to a person who was not strictly a client.98
However, as was later held in Van Erp II, this duty sprang from the terms of the
retainer between the solicitors and the testatrix.99 Under a retainer by which the
solicitors expressly assumed custodial responsibilities, the majority inferred
duties that could be reasonably expected of the solicitors when the client died.
For Brennan J, the duty that the solicitors owed to this executor was to disclose
to him that they held the will.100 Deane J outlined the purposes of the duty:
In accepting responsibility for custody of the testatrix’s will after her death, the
firm effectively assumed the custodianship of the testatrix’s testamentary inten-
tions. If the firm simply retained custody of the will without disclosing its ex-
istence to anyone at all, those testamentary intentions would obviously be likely
to be frustrated — by grant of probate of an earlier will, by grant of letters of
administration on the basis that the testatrix had died intestate or by the estate
remaining unadministered and the assets being neglected, misused or misap-
propriated.101
95 (1988) 164 CLR 539.
96 Ibid 566.
97 Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ; Mason CJ and Wilson J dissenting.
98 Cf Dunn v Fairs, Blissard, Barnes & Stowe (1961) 105 SJ 932, 932, 933, where Barry J held that
no duty was owed to an executor. This did not prevent a personal representative bringing, under
the survival of actions legislation, an action that the deceased might have had: eg Otter [1953] 1
Ch 280.
99 Hawkins II (1988) 164 CLR 539, 544 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 577 (Deane J).
100 Ibid 553–4. See also Hawkins I (1986) 5 NSWLR 109, 137–8.
101 Hawkins II (1988) 164 CLR 539, 580.
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While not defining the particular duties imposed on solicitors to ensure that the
testator’s intentions were promoted, Deane J did hold that the solicitors were
negligent in failing ‘to take any positive steps at all to locate … Hawkins during
the period of more than six years after … the death of the testatrix’.102 Gaudron J
also considered that the solicitors should have taken ‘reasonable steps to inform
[the executor] that they were in possession of the will’.103 There was no decision
as to whether the duty to advise the executor was conditional on the solicitors’
actual knowledge of the testatrix’s death. In the Court of Appeal below,
McHugh JA had refused to decide this point, but by suggesting that there were
circumstances where solicitors ‘ought to know of the death of the testator’,104 he
intimated that there would still be a duty to advise the executor in that case.105
This would necessarily mean a finding of negligence — advice can only be given
to discharge the duty to advise if the solicitor knows of the death. Hawkins II
therefore also hints at a duty to take steps to learn if a person for whom a will is
held has died.
III   REPOSING TESTAMENTARY INTENTIONS
Even though will-making has been a constant of legal practice since the
13th century, adjudication on solicitors’ duties in the area was scarce until the
latter part of the 20th century. Fewer opportunities for courts to address will-
making practices could arise when the duties were limited to the testator client.
The ambulatory character of a will means that, if a solicitor’s mistakes are
discovered before death, the mistakes will have caused no loss and can be
inexpensively corrected by the preparation (for no fee) of a new will.106 After
death, personal representatives might succeed to the testator’s rights to enforce
the retainer. However, representatives are bound to administer the estate as it
devolved to them without the will and, again, no loss can be ascribed to the
estate if property is not to pass as the testator intended.107 It is the rise of liability
to third parties that has given both motive and means to litigating solicitors’ will-
making practices, and reasons for courts to clarify the duties which those
practices entail.
The content of these duties has now been stated with some precision, but the
law of negligence still fails to give coherent reasons for why they are owed to
beneficiaries and executors. The dissentient in Van Erp II, McHugh J, agreed
with the majority that the beneficiary’s loss was reasonably foreseeable.108
However, his Honour lamented that, although each of the other five Justices
referred to any one or more of eight other reasons for finding a duty of care to a
102 Ibid 580.
103 Ibid 598.
104 Hawkins I (1986) 5 NSWLR 109, 139.
105 Ibid 139–40.
106 Buckley, 42 P 900, 902 (Cal, 1895); Otter [1953] 1 Ch 280, 287; Heyer, 74 Cal Rptr 225, 230
(Cal, 1969); White [1995] 2 AC 207, 224; Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159, 173.
107 Spivey, 526 NYS 2d 145, 147 (Sup Ct App Div 2d Dept, 1988); Barcelo, 923 SW 2d 575, 579,
580 (Tex, 1996); Bates, above n 12, 327.
108 (1997) 188 CLR 159, 174 (Dawson J), 188 (Toohey J), 201 (McHugh J), 234 (Gummow J).
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beneficiary, together they could not agree on any one reason for that duty to
arise.109 Later decisions on tortious liability have not disciplined the Court’s
rationale for recognising a duty to third parties.110 However, by far the most
compelling consideration that has attracted judges to finding third party liability
in will-making cases is the intuition that there must be some remedy for the
solicitor’s mistake. In the early stages of Lucas, Shoemaker J said that
‘[r]ejection of the privity doctrine in this type of case is particularly justified
because no other person can recover for the loss caused by the attorney’s
negligence.’111 In similar terms, in Ross, Megarry V-C noted that without third
party liability, ‘[t]he only person who has a valid claim has suffered no loss, and
the only person who has suffered a loss has no valid claim.’112
This powerful rhetoric underscores a sense of injustice that has been voiced
repeatedly.113 Injustice there is — if, indeed, the beneficiary has suffered a loss at
the solicitor’s hands but cannot demand that someone give reparation. However,
the question is whether the beneficiary has suffered a ‘loss’. Judicial critics have
emphasised that the beneficiary loses nothing. The beneficiary had no legal
interest in the property. There was some expectation that the beneficiary would
receive something, but the legal quality of this expectation is weaker than even a
spes successionis that might pass to an heir-at-law or next of kin under intestacy
rules. This expectation is not even a defective right that equitable remedies might
perfect.114
Two answers have been given to the criticism that the beneficiary loses noth-
ing. First, in Van Erp II, Brennan CJ was aware that, in one sense, no loss was
suffered.115 His Honour and Gaudron J then suggested that these cases were not
really concerned about the loss of, at best, a spes.116 As Brennan CJ put it,
‘compensation is sought for the loss of the property which, but for the negligence
of the defendant, the plaintiff would have taken.’117 But this argument risks
circularity, as it suggests that the ground for recognising a claim under the law of
109 Ibid 215.
110 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180; Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 178 ALR 634;
Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and
Callinan JJ, 11 October 2001); Warne, above n 2, 295–300.
111 Lucas v Hamm, 11 Cal Rptr 727, 731 (1st Dist Ct App, 1961).
112 [1980] 1 Ch 297, 303.
113 Heyer, 74 Cal Rptr 225, 229 (Cal, 1969); Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 320 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App,
1985) (Pearson J dissenting); White [1995] 2 AC 207, 220, 233, 259, 262; Cancer Research
Campaign (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Harman J, 27 October 1997); Van
Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159, 165, 187, 195, 202; Smolinski [1995] 10 WWR 68, 85–6; Barcelo,
923 SW 2d 575, 580 (Tex, 1996) (Cornyn and Abbott JJ dissenting); Carr-Glynn I [1997] 2 All
ER 614, 623–4; Carr-Glynn II [1999] Ch 326, 335, 337–8, 339; Earl [1998] 2 WWR 522, 529.
Cf Seale [1982] VR 193, 210–11; Bates, above n 12, 334; K M Stanton, ‘The Impulse to Do
Practical Justice: The Legacy of White v Jones’ (1998) 14 Professional Negligence 188; John
Fleming, ‘The Solicitor and the Disappointed Beneficiary’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review
344, 345.
114 Buckley, 42 P 900, 902 (Cal, 1895); White [1995] 2 AC 207, 251; Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR
159, 211–12; Seale [1982] VR 193, 220. Cf Ventura County Humane Society, 115 Cal Rptr 464,
470 (1st Dist Ct App, 1974); Hawkins I (1986) 5 NSWLR 109, 142; Earl [1998] 2 WWR 522,
535.
115 (1997) 188 CLR 159, 168.
116 Ibid 170, 197.
117 Ibid 170. See also Ross [1980] 1 Ch 297.
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negligence is that the right to the property would be established if duties imposed
by the law of negligence were discharged.
The second, more compelling, answer is provided by the law of succession. In
White, Steyn LJ’s response to the argument that the beneficiary loses nothing if a
will fails through a solicitor’s carelessness was to conceptualise the beneficiary’s
claim over the property by reference to testamentary intention:
The negligent solicitor assumes a responsibility to give effect to his client’s
testamentary wishes. … The solicitor further knows that upon the death of the
testator the beneficiary’s interest crystallises and that the mere expectation
ought then to become an entitlement to the legacy. Due to the solicitor’s negli-
gence the beneficiary’s interest never becomes an entitlement. That seems a
principled basis on which to impose liability in tort.118
Here, liability is explained by the common law’s longstanding program to place
intention at the centre of property distribution on death. This has occurred largely
by the progressive dismantling of restraints on the alienation of property. The
process by which intention became central in testamentary succession similarly
enhanced the testator’s freedom to dispose of his or her estate how and to whom
the testator thought fit, and was checked only by family provision laws.119 It also
reinforced the need to be satisfied that the will that ultimately governed the
distribution of the estate should properly and completely reflect the testator’s last
intentions for the property. This need was one reason for maintaining the
rigorous formalities surrounding the creation of a valid will. On the other hand,
the defective execution cases show that the failure to comply strictly with the
formalities of signing and witnessing can also defeat the testator’s last intentions
for the property.120 In an effort to have the order for probate give effect to the
substance of the testator’s intentions, statute gives some concession to less
scrupulous execution. This is more completely realised where the pattern of the
Wills Act 1936 (SA) is followed, as a defectively executed will can be proved if
the court is satisfied that it expresses the intentions of the testator.121 It is only
partially realised in Queensland, where the Van Erp I case arose, because
substantial (though not complete) compliance with formalities is required for a
will to be proved.122
Accordingly, it is possible to understand the law presented in White and Van
Erp II as correcting the inability of statute to ensure that the proven substantive
intentions of the testator are realised. In other words, the powerful emphasis that
the modern law places on the realisation of testamentary intention is advanced by
both the law of succession and, where that fails, the law of negligence.123 Indeed,
the curative purpose of the law of negligence was reinforced by the Court of
118 [1995] 2 AC 207, 237.
119 Mackie and Burton, above n 69, 41–2; Charles Harpum, Malcolm Grant and Stuart Bridge, The
Law of Real Property (6th ed, 2000) 585–90; Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159, 224.
120 White [1995] 2 AC 207, 278.
121 Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12(2); Wills Act 1992 (Tas) s 26; Wills Act
1997 (Vic) s 9; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 34. See also Bates, above n 12, 339.
122 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 9(a).
123 For comments to this effect, see Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159, 232; Carr-Glynn II [1999]
Ch 326, 339; Fleming, above n 113, 348.
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Appeal’s decision in Walker that a beneficiary who could obtain rectification of a
will must do so before the claim in tort can be brought.124 The reason therefore
that an intended, though disappointed, beneficiary is entitled to damages is not
because an existing right to property has been lost. It is because the disappointed
beneficiary, like a beneficiary under a valid will, is the object of the testator’s
intention, and the law does its utmost to give effect to that intention.
As the law now stands, effect can be given to both the testator’s formal inten-
tions (as found in the proved will or deemed by intestacy rules) and the testator’s
substantive intentions (as might be established by other evidence). True, the
different means that might be used to realise formal and merely substantive
intentions can also enlarge the pool of assets available to ‘formal’ and ‘substan-
tive’ beneficiaries.125 To take the Van Erp case as an example, under the terms of
the will for which probate was granted, the residuary beneficiary gained a
windfall half-share in a house that comprised part of the estate. The plaintiff,
who was denied this share only because her husband had witnessed the signing
of the will, gained the equivalent of this half-share in damages as she was the
object of the testatrix’s substantive intentions for that share. The testatrix’s
formal and substantive intentions were realised, and her formal and substantive
beneficiaries provided for, from her estate and her solicitor’s (or her solicitor’s
insurer’s) pocket.
An appreciation of the central role of animus testandi in will-making cases
sharpens the definition of the solicitor’s responsibility and its limits. The
solicitor is caretaker of the client’s testamentary intentions.126 The Florida
approach, in only recognising intentions as expressed in a will, cannot be
reconciled with this role. It demands that the lawyer produce a valid will, even
one significantly unresponsive to the client’s wishes.127 Elsewhere, there is
ample support for this understanding of will-making practice. The duty upheld in
Carr-Glynn II, ensuring that the land (as part of the estate) was capable of
devise, was held to arise from the general obligation ‘to take care to ensure that
effect is given to the testator’s testamentary intentions.’128 In addressing attesta-
tion duties in Van Erp II, Davies JA referred to the role of the solicitor as ‘the
124 [1999] 1 WLR 727, 739, 742.
125 White [1995] 2 AC 207, 224–5, 257–8, 293; Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159, 213; Carr-Glynn I
[1997] 2 All ER 614, 628; Corbett I [1999] EWCA 1379 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Morritt,
Auld and Clarke LJJ, 30 March 1999) [16]–[17]; Corbett II (Unreported, Queen’s Bench Divi-
sion, Eady J, 25 May 2000) 5, 6. Cf Walker [1999] 1 All ER 685, 742. This was extended in
Carr-Glynn II [1999] Ch 326, 337–8, where Chadwick LJ recognised that, in some cases, the
estate and the beneficiary could have separate claims against the solicitor.
126 Sutherland [1980] 2 NZLR 536, 546–7. Cf Whittingham (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 353;
Trusted v Clifford Chance (a firm) (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Parker J,
17 May 1996) 61–2 (‘Clifford Chance’). The term ‘caretaker’ is used on purpose, emphasising
the moral sense of custodianship and trusteeship without being limited by the implications each
of those terms has when understood as a legal concept. This parallels Clive Boxer’s comment on
White, which he claims reasserted ‘[t]he traditional role of the solicitor as quasi trustee for fam-
ily property’: ‘The Lords’ View of a Solicitor’ (1995) 139 Solicitors Journal 372, 373.
127 Ogle, 466 NE 2d 224, 226 (Ill, 1984); De Maris, 426 So 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App,
1983); Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 318–19 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985) cf at 319–32.
128 [1999] Ch 326, 337, 339. See also Ventura County Humane Society, 115 Cal Rptr 464, 469
(1st Dist Ct App, 1974); Barcelo, 923 SW 2d 575, 581 (Tex, 1996) (Cornyn and Abbott JJ dis-
senting).
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assumption … of responsibility for giving legal effect to the testamentary
intentions of the testator’.129 And, on appeal, Gummow J reconciled attestation
duties with the custodial duties of Hawkins II under the solicitors’ ‘position of
control over the realisation of the testamentary intentions of the testatrix.’130
The duty to advise or provide against accidental revocation by marriage was
deduced in Heyer from the attorney’s duty ‘to fulfil the testamentary instructions
of his client’.131 As has been seen, in Hawkins II Deane J thought the solicitors’
custodial duties stemmed not so much from the firm’s agreement to hold the will
as from the fact that ‘the firm effectively assumed the custodianship of the
testatrix’s testamentary intentions.’132 Although this language is conditioned by
principles of tortious liability for financial loss, it also illuminates the special,
distinctive position of the solicitor in will-making practice and the general
responsibility that position creates to ensure that the testamentary intention is
realised.133 This position depends on the client having testamentary capacity, and
could not arise if the solicitor rightly believed that the client lacked capacity but,
against the solicitor’s advice, the solicitor was still instructed to prepare a will.134
Peculiar terms in the retainer might also relieve a solicitor from the general
responsibility associated with the role of caretaker of the client’s testamentary
intention,135 but the usual instructions in will-making practice would oblige the
solicitor to ensure that the substantive intentions of the testator are given proper
formal expression. To the extent that the client’s intentions are not realised in a
legally effective will or by rectification then, as caretaker of the animus testandi,
the solicitor will carry the financial burden of approximating the testator’s
substantive intentions in damages.
The gravity of the solicitor’s task becomes more evident once his or her role is
understood in these terms. The solicitor becomes intimately entwined in the legal
arrangements for securing the disposal of the testator’s property on death and, in
a sense, pledges the solicitor’s own property (and indemnity insurance) as a
guarantee for fulfilling the testator’s intentions. Equally, both the peculiarity and
enhanced significance of that role demand that it be carefully confined to the
limits of the testator’s instructed intention.136 This has two consequences. Firstly,
the solicitor’s duty to the beneficiary cannot arise until that intention has formed,
and instructions to that effect are given. As Parker J stated plainly in Clifford
Chance:
[N]o tortious duty of care will arise in favour of an intended beneficiary unless
and until the client has (a) decided to confer on the intended beneficiary a par-
ticular intended testamentary benefit (being the benefit for the loss of which the
129 [1995] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-317, 62 066.
130 Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159, 232. See also at 195. Stickley, above n 48, 209, probably
overstates the differences between Van Erp II and Carr-Glynn II.
131 74 Cal Rptr 225, 228 (Cal, 1969). See also McAbee, 340 So 2d 1167, 1169 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App,
1976); Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 320 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985).
132 Hawkins II (1988) 164 CLR 539, 580. Cf 545.
133 White [1995] 2 AC 207, 224. Cf 291.
134 Cf Ryan [2000] 1 NZLR 700, 718.
135 See, eg, Smolinski [1995] 10 WWR 68.
136 Walker [1999] 1 WLR 727, 737, 740–1.
M.U.L.R. — Mortensen— printed 04/26/02 at 12:42 PM — page 77 of 28
2002]  Solicitors’ Will-Making Duties 77
intended beneficiary seeks to hold the solicitor liable), and (b) retained the so-
licitor for that purpose.137
Secondly, the duty is limited to those beneficiaries that the solicitor knows are
intended by the testator to benefit from the estate.138 The case law is replete with
references to the duty of care owed to an ‘intended beneficiary’.139 In Van Erp II,
all of the judges in the High Court framed the object of the duty as the ‘intended
beneficiary’.140 However, it was Pincus JA in the court below who defined most
accurately the object as it has developed in the cases: ‘the plaintiff must be a
person who is precisely identified in the solicitor’s instructions’.141
If there is a duty to the plaintiff, it must be compatible with the client’s in-
structions. So, provided the client has testamentary capacity, a solicitor receiving
instructions to cut a person out of the estate could not owe any duties to that
person.142 Pincus JA’s formulation also excludes a duty to ‘incidental benefici-
aries’, that is, beneficiaries of the estate of a beneficiary of the client’s estate.143
Furthermore, it should also preclude any duties to a ‘potential beneficiary’, that
is, a member of a class defining permissible recipients of a gift in the will (such
as the objects of a power of appointment) but not specifically named as a
beneficiary by the testator. For example, in Ventura County Humane Society,144 a
quarter of the residue of the estate was, as the testator instructed, left to a
‘Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Local or National)’, a term
137 Clifford Chance (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Parker J, 17 May 1996) 63. See
Luntz, above n 12, 287. Again, this implies that the client’s testamentary capacity is a prerequi-
site to the duty to a beneficiary arising: Ryan [2000] 1 NZLR 700, 718–19.
138 Cf Helen Roberts, ‘Liability of Solicitors to Disappointed Beneficiaries’ (1997) 71 Australian
Law Journal 674, 676, 677.
139 Lucas I, 364 P 2d 685, 689 (Cal, 1961); Heyer, 74 Cal Rptr 225, 229, 231 (Cal, 1969); Ventura
County Humane Society, 115 Cal Rptr 464, 468, 469 (1st Dist Ct App, 1974); McAbee, 340 So
2d 1167, 1169–70 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1976); Ross [1980] 1 Ch 297, 309; Sutherland [1980] 2
NZLR 536, 546, 547; Gartside [1983] NZLR 37, 47; De Maris, 426 So 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla 3d
Dist Ct App, 1983); Ogle, 466 NE 2d 224, 226, 227 (Ill, 1984); Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 317,
318 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985); Rosenstone, 560 So 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 1990);
Berry, 717 SW 2d 716, 718, 719 (Tex Ct App, 1986); Weir [1990] SLT 266, 270; White [1995] 2
AC 207, 222, 239, 262, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280–1; Cancer Research Campaign (Unreported,
High Court of England and Wales, Harman J, 27 October 1997); Palmros, 672 NE 2d 1245,
1246 (Ill App Ct 2d Dist, 1996); Clifford Chance (Unreported, High Court of England and
Wales, Parker J, 17 May 1996) 62; Van Erp I [1995] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-317, 62 065,
62 066, 62 067; Barcelo, 923 SW 2d 575 (Tex, 1996); Salter, 717 So 2d 141, 142 (Fla 5th Dist Ct
App, 1998); Summerville [1998] NSWSC 52 (Unreported, Mason P, Sheller and Beazley JJA,
26 February 1998) 7; Carr-Glynn I [1997] 2 All ER 614, 621, 623, 625, 626; Carr-Glynn II
[1999] Ch 326, 334, 335; Earl [1998] 2 WWR 522, 530, 538; Walker [1999] 1 WLR 727, 732;
Punford [1998] EWCA 2008, [12]–[14]; Gibbons (Unreported, High Court of England and
Wales, Blackburne J, 5 April 2000); Corbett II (Unreported, Queen’s Bench Division, Eady J,
25 May 2000) 2, 5, 6; Corbett III [2001] 3 All ER 769, 775; Babcock, 760 So 2d 1056, 1056–7
(Fla 4th Dist Ct App, 2000); Ryan [2000] 1 NZLR 700, 718.
140 (1997) 188 CLR 159, 167–8, 170 (Brennan CJ), 181–3 (Dawson J), 193–7 (Gaudron J), 200
(McHugh J), 233 (Gummow J).
141 [1995] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-317, 62 067.
142 Cf Worby v Rosser [1998] EWCA 3545 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Nourse and Ward LJJ,
17 September 1998) [2], [7]; Ryan [2000] 1 NZLR 700, 718–19; Corbett III [2001] 3 All ER
769, 780, 781–2.
143 Kecskemeti [1992] TLR 666, 667; MacDougall [1994] SLT 1178, 1184; Barcelo, 923 SW 2d
575, 579 (Tex, 1996); Salter, 717 So 2d 141, 142 (Fla 5th Dist Ct App, 1998).
144 115 Cal Rptr 464, 470 (1st Dist Ct App, 1974).
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that included the plaintiff and numerous other organisations. The attorneys were
held not to owe a duty (to give legal effect to the client’s instructions) to the
plaintiff as one ‘potential beneficiary’ among many.145
No judge has held that the duty could extend beyond that precisely identified
by the instructing testator. If there were duties to incidental or potential benefici-
aries or, as we will see, even those merely hoping to be beneficiaries, those
duties would certainly have to be developed on some ground other than the
working-out of the law’s program of giving effect to the testator’s intentions.146
IV  THE HENDERSON TROUT  CASES
A  Lady Trout, Henderson Trout and the Trout Collection
Sir Leon Trout and Lady Trout were Queensland’s most significant private art
collectors. Paintings, sculpture, antiques and other objets d’art were displayed at
the Trouts’ home, Everton House, in Brisbane. They had also been generous
benefactors; large donations of paintings had been made to the Queensland Art
Gallery (‘the Gallery’). Sir Leon, a solicitor, died in 1978 and the whole collec-
tion passed to his widow. The testatrix, Lady Trout, died on 24 May 1988. In
accordance with her will of 1986, the art works were sold and the proceeds
distributed between five charities.147
However, the Gallery contended that there should have been a later will in
1988 and blamed the testatrix’s solicitors for its failure to materialise. According
to the Gallery, this will would have included a bequest to it of all paintings in the
Trout collection. The solicitors were Henderson Trout, descendants of Sir Leon’s
original firm, which had supported his widow with free legal and business
services and which had (from January 1988) been instructed to prepare her new
will. The Gallery alleged that Henderson Trout’s delay in preparing this will
meant that the testatrix died before it was produced in an executable form but,
had the solicitors not been so negligent, the will would have been executed
before her death. So, the Gallery claimed that the solicitors were liable to pay it
damages for the loss of the paintings.148
The evidence presented in Henderson Trout I was ambiguous and contradic-
tory. At trial, Chesterman J’s interpretation of events often relied on his findings
about the testatrix’s and the solicitors’ credibility. However, the judge’s conclu-
sions about the testatrix’s intentions towards the Gallery are central to any
sensible appraisal of the judgments. The Court of Appeal effectively accepted
the facts as presented by Chesterman J, despite the major argument on appeal
being a reinterpretation of the facts and despite a lengthy factual analysis by the
appellate judges.149 The testatrix’s role as benefactress to the Gallery ended in
1982 when, feeling slighted by people there, she excluded it from her estate. She
145 Ibid 466, 469. See also Bates, above n 12, 330–1.
146 Ross [1980] 1 Ch 297, 322.
147 Henderson Trout I [1998] QSC 250 (Unreported, Chesterman J, 10 November 1998) [1]–[7].
148 Ibid [123].
149 Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [5], [10], [33]–[34], [35], [44].
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made six wills after that, none leaving anything to the Gallery.150 Her abiding
purpose was to have the collection maintained in a way that ensured that she and
Sir Leon would receive perpetual recognition as art collectors, and different
ways of achieving that objective were explored. In late 1987, her resentment
towards the Gallery had cooled and the solicitors were told that she would
proceed in January 1988 with the preparation of a new will leaving paintings to
the Gallery.151 The four drafts prepared provided for the Gallery to receive all of
the paintings. The fourth draft was produced in April, but the partner responsible
believed detail about a gift of jewellery was to come from the testatrix before he
could finalise the will. On 5 May 1988, Lady Trout said that she never intended
to make this gift and, believing the partner was rude to her, terminated the
retainer. On 12 May 1988, she instructed another firm, Flower & Hart, to settle
the will.152 The testatrix died before this was done.
Chesterman J accepted that neither Henderson Trout nor Flower & Hart under-
stood that the preparation of the will was urgent. The testatrix happily agreed to
the latter’s timetable of ‘a week or so’, even though at that stage the will could
have been settled in less than a day.153 Even more significantly, the judge felt
that the testatrix would not have signed the will even if it were ready.154 While
the will was being prepared, she told her local alderman that she was resolved
not to leave the paintings to the Gallery. They discussed the possibility of the
city council maintaining the whole Trout collection in Everton House for the
benefit of the people of Brisbane. As late as 19 May 1988, the alderman wrote to
the testatrix to that end, advising that the Lord Mayor would visit on 26 May to
view the collection. Lady Trout was awaiting the outcome of the planned
discussions with the Lord Mayor before committing herself to signing the
will.155 Chesterman J concluded ‘that Lady Trout had not, by the time she died,
unequivocally decided that [the Gallery] should be the beneficiary of her art
collection’.156
B  Precis of Judgments
Even though all judges ruled against the Gallery, there are significant differ-
ences between the judgments as to whether the solicitors owed it a duty of care
and, if they did, whether they were negligent. Chesterman J held, firstly, that
there was no duty of care.157 Secondly, he concluded that, even on the assump-
tion that there was this duty, there was no negligence.158 Thirdly, he found that,
150 Henderson Trout I [1998] QSC 250 (Unreported, Chesterman J, 10 November 1998) [82]–[83].
151 Ibid [24]–[28], [36]–[40].
152 Ibid [38]–[72].
153 Ibid [72], [89]–[90].
154 Ibid [70]–[71], [118].
155 Ibid [73]–[77], [103].
156 Ibid [80]. See also at [122].
157 Ibid [137]–[140].
158 Ibid [141]–[169].
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even if there was negligence, it did not cause the loss claimed by the Gallery.159
Fourthly, for good measure, he considered that if negligence causing loss had
been established, damages would amount to just under A$9 million.160
The majority in the Court of Appeal disagreed with this analysis. Pincus JA
held that the solicitors did owe the Gallery a duty of care161 and that they were
negligent.162 Byrne J said he agreed ‘substantially with Pincus JA’s analysis of
the evidence as well as with his factual conclusions’.163 This seems to endorse
Pincus JA’s conclusions that a duty of care was owed to the Gallery and that
there was negligence, although it does not address those issues explicitly.
Thomas JA held that no duty of care arose on the part of the solicitors to the
Gallery,164 and that there was no negligence.165 The three judges in the Court of
Appeal nevertheless agreed that, even if there were negligence, it could not have
caused the loss claimed by the Gallery.166 They therefore dismissed the appeal.
C  Causation
The one point on which all trial and appellate judges agreed that the solicitors
should escape liability was causation. The Gallery’s argument that the solicitors
negligently caused it to lose the paintings was twofold. Firstly, it alleged that the
solicitors should have had the will ready for execution by the end of April 1988.
Secondly, the Gallery argued that had they done so the testatrix would have
signed the will so that, when she died in May, the paintings would have passed to
the Gallery.167 The reasons for rejecting this argument were summarised by
Chesterman J: ‘The fact that Lady Trout did not instruct (and did not then want)
to sign a will shows that there is no causal connection between the defendant’s
inactivity or inattention in preparing such a document and the plaintiff’s loss’.168
This reveals two related considerations that supersede the possibility that the
solicitors caused any loss, though each could independently do so without the
other.
The first is that, on 5 May 1988, the testatrix denied Henderson Trout any
opportunity to arrange the execution of the will by terminating the retainer and
instructing Flower & Hart to prepare a will instead. Chesterman J169 and, in the
Court of Appeal, Thomas JA and Byrne J170 thought this an important fact
159 Ibid [170]–[190].
160 Ibid [191]–[203].
161 Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [29]–[31].
162 Ibid [31]–[32].
163 Ibid [48].
164 Ibid [38]–[41].
165 Ibid [41].
166 Ibid [33], [42], [45]–[47].
167 Henderson Trout I [1998] QSC 250 (Unreported, Chesterman J, 10 November 1998) [170].
168 Ibid [181].
169 Ibid [174].
170 Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [42], [45], [46].
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disproving causation. The second consideration, raised by all the judges, is that
the testatrix’s tentative plan to leave the paintings to the Gallery had not meta-
morphosed into a testamentary intention to that effect. At the time of her death,
Lady Trout was considering two alternative programs for preserving the Trout
collection: a gift of the collection to the city council and a gift of the paintings to
the Gallery. The will-making process was furthering the latter of those options,
while arrangements like the Lord Mayor’s visit were being made to further the
former. Not unusually, the testatrix was pursuing arrangements for two incom-
patible projects while deferring the final decision about which to implement. The
prospects of a gift to the council could not be assessed until after the Lord
Mayor’s visit, so — even in the testatrix’s dying days — she had no fixed
intention that the paintings would be left to the Gallery. The fact that instructions
were given to prepare a new will does not, in itself, mean that the testatrix
intended to leave the paintings to the Gallery.171
The significance of Henderson Trout II is certainly open to different interpre-
tations. If it is merely considered in terms of its result, Henderson Trout II is an
uncontroversial case. The Queensland Court of Appeal held that ‘a hopeful’ — a
person who hoped (but was not intended) to be a beneficiary of a testator’s
largesse — could not recover damages when it transpired that the hopeful was
not named as a beneficiary in the testator’s last valid will. In this sense, it is of
little importance whether that result is attributed to the lack of a causal nexus
between the solicitor’s conduct and the hopeful’s disappointment or to the
premise that the solicitor owed no duty of care to the hopeful. Alternatively, the
reasoning in the judgments in Henderson Trout II could be taken more seriously.
Indeed, the decision could be understood as the most significant attempt of an
Australian court to explore the implications of the High Court’s decision in Van
Erp II. That is the assertion made in this article and it gives rise to some concern
about the reasoning behind the Court of Appeal’s decision.
D  Duty of Care
Even if the outcome in Henderson Trout II is correct, the decision that the
solicitors owed a duty of care to the Gallery is conceptually precarious. Pin-
cus JA referred to the Gallery as ‘a disappointed beneficiary’,172 but effectively
accepted that the Gallery’s true position could be regarded as nothing more than
‘a hopeful’. His Honour upheld Chesterman J’s factual conclusions, including his
finding that the testatrix had no settled intention to leave the paintings to the
Gallery, stating that Lady Trout ‘had not quite made up her mind about the
matter’.173 So, the finding that the solicitors owed a duty of care to the Gallery
can be construed as a finding that they owed duties to a person who was contem-
171 Henderson Trout I [1998] QSC 250 (Unreported, Chesterman J, 10 November 1998) [176],
[179]; Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [32]–[33], [42], [46].
172 Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [31].
173 Ibid [34].
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plated as a possible beneficiary of the testatrix’s estate, but who at the testatrix’s
death was not intended to be a beneficiary.
This duty was found by analogy with Van Erp II. To an extent, this was influ-
enced by the incoherence of the majority’s reasoning in Van Erp II and the High
Court’s inability in that case to state any coordinating principle of a solicitor’s
liability to third parties.174 That being so, Pincus JA said:
If a mistake in arranging for the execution of a Will as in Hill v Van Erp and in
Somerville v Walsh … suffices to create a duty of care, then I can see no reason
why it should be held that a disappointed beneficiary, whose hope of benefit is
evident to the solicitor engaged, should not have a right to sue if that hope fails
of realisation because of the solicitor’s culpable delay in preparing a Will.175
Despite being conscious of the dangers of analogical reasoning or ‘incremental-
ism’,176 the comparison with Van Erp and Summerville led Pincus JA to conclude
that (causation aside) there was a duty that vested rights in a hopeful.177
In determining rights and liabilities in novel cases, incrementalism is certainly
an accepted approach for judges to adopt. It has a respectable pedigree in the
general area of tort that determines solicitors’ professional duties178 and has
become more significant since Van Erp II, where a majority of the High Court
rejected the use of the concept of proximity as the means of identifying a duty of
care.179 It is still questionable whether the incremental extension of tortious
liabilities to third parties is within a State appellate court’s (in contrast to the
High Court’s) law-making role and it is a role that the Queensland Court of
Appeal has eschewed in other financial loss cases.180 Furthermore, in Van Erp II,
Dawson J hinted that the decision in that case was so dependent on the position
of an intended beneficiary that Van Erp II itself may not be a safe point from
which to extend solicitors’ duties.181 However, the problem that analogising
created in Henderson Trout II can arguably be addressed in more doctrinal terms.
E  Animus Testandi
On concluding in Henderson Trout II that, before withdrawing instructions
from the solicitors, the testatrix had not finally decided to leave the paintings to
the Gallery, the Court of Appeal implicitly accepted that the case came outside
the decision in Van Erp II. Henderson Trout II could not be a defective execution
case like Van Erp II until there was an attempt to have the will signed and
witnessed, but the former case did not even meet the more general principles of
174 Ibid [30]–[31].
175 Ibid [31] (citation omitted).
176 Ibid. See also Van Erp I [1995] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-317, 62 067.
177 Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [31], [33].
178 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 481 (Brennan J); Hawkins II (1988)
164 CLR 539, 556 (Brennan J).
179 (1997) 188 CLR 159.
180 Fangrove Pty Ltd v Tod Group Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 236, 241, 242.
181 (1997) 188 CLR 159, 187; Bruce Feldthusen, ‘Pure Economic Loss in the High Court of
Australia: Reinventing the Square Wheel?’ (2000) 8 Torts Law Journal 33, 50.
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liability in Van Erp II that rested on the duty owed to an intended beneficiary.
Pincus JA’s analogising between ‘defective execution cases’ and ‘failure to
prepare cases’ was certainly appropriate.182 However, it is the evidence of a
settled, instructed intention in ‘defective execution’ cases like Van Erp II, and
‘failure to prepare’ cases like White and Summerville, that makes the analogy
between them uncontroversial. It also distinguishes both types of cases from
Henderson Trout II.
Without the testatrix’s proved intention to benefit the Gallery, Henderson
Trout II lacks the motivations for liability that give the other will-making cases
juridical coherence: the justice of realising the testator’s intentions; the solici-
tor’s role as caretaker of the testamentary intention; and the duties associated
with that role. As a result, it is suggested that the appropriate analogy for
Henderson Trout II is not a defective execution case, but rather Smolinski,183
where there was a limited retainer. In both Henderson Trout II and Smolinski, the
instructions did not repose the testamentary intention in the solicitors as that
intention could not crystallise until a contingency was satisfied. In Smolinski, the
contingency was at least the testator’s receipt of independent advice that the
solicitor was an appropriate beneficiary. In Henderson Trout II, the contingency
was most likely the abandonment of plans for an endowment to the city council
and the instruction that the will be engrossed. Exceptionally, for will-making
practice, the instructions in Henderson Trout II were only to prepare a draft will
and no larger role could be inferred from them. The draft will might have
eventually become the animus testandi. Larger duties might then have arisen but,
applying the test set by Parker J in Clifford Chance, this would not occur until
the testatrix had truly decided to leave the paintings to the Gallery and had
instructed the solicitors for that purpose.184 At the testatrix’s death, the terms of
the will had not reached that point.
F  Concurrent Duties
The expansion of lawyers’ liabilities after Hawkins II was accentuated by
Deane J’s belief in that case that tortious duties to a client could be over and
above those arising in contract.185 That is no longer true. The High Court has
since held that tortious and contractual duties are concurrent,186 leading other
courts to rein in some of lawyers’ duties in tort.187 Strictly, the new doctrine
cannot control tortious duties to third parties as there is necessarily no parallel
contractual relationship. However, before Henderson Trout II, the content of the
duties owed to beneficiaries was concurrent with the content of the duties owed
182 Summerville was classified as a defective execution case: Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93
(Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J, 24 March 2000) [31]. Chesterman J had
noted similarities with Gartside [1983] NZLR 37: Henderson Trout I [1998] QSC 250 (Unre-
ported, Chesterman J, 10 November 1998) [138].
183 [1995] 10 WWR 68.
184 Clifford Chance (Unreported, High Court of England and Wales, Parker J, 17 May 1996) 62.
185 Hawkins II (1988) 164 CLR 539, 583–5.
186 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 20–3.
187 Cf Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2000) 36 ACSR 462, 531–4, 567–8, 687–90 and Waimond v Byrne
(1989) 18 NSWLR 642, 652.
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to clients under the retainer, even though the personal objects of those duties
were different. So, consistent with concurrent liability, courts have insisted that a
duty was owed to the beneficiary because the beneficiary’s and testator’s
interests were identical.188 Megarry V-C stated in Ross that the duty to the
intended beneficiary, ‘far from diluting the solicitor’s duty to his client, marches
with it, and, if anything, strengthens it.’189 This identity is created, and dissolved,
by the client’s testamentary intention. However, the Henderson Trout II obliga-
tion does not necessarily concur with the obligations to the client under the
retainer. The duty to the hopeful, being independent and often prior to the
testator’s intention, cannot originate in the retainer. This is precisely why
Thomas JA dissented on the question of a duty of care in Henderson Trout II, his
concern being that the duty to the hopeful should not override the duty to the
client.190 A duty to a hopeful may not necessarily march against the duty to the
client, but there is a significant risk that the duty to the hopeful will jostle that
duty. And, the fact that the duties to the testator and the hopeful are not bound
together by testamentary intention also creates problems in the performance and
management of both.
V  CONCLUSIONS:  MANAGING DUTIES  TO A ‘HOPEFUL’
The will-making cases have general implications for legal practice, and cau-
tious lawyers are best to disregard suggestions that any particular decision is
limited to its facts.191 Despite the theory that a finding of negligence is a factual
conclusion that is not authoritative for later cases,192 the post-Van Erp II impor-
tance of incrementalism means a finding of liability in one case will be signifi-
cant when adjudging factually similar disputes. The theory advanced in this
article — that the will-making duties rest on the solicitor’s role as caretaker of
the testamentary intention — implies a general application of the duties stated in
the will-making cases.
For the most part, these duties can be managed by wise use of basic legal
knowledge and standard, but inexpensive, file and office procedures.193 It is
certainly true that ignorance of the law relating to will-creation is now inexcus-
able. There is no real complexity in the rules concerning the minimum content of
a will; the age, qualifications and disqualifications of the testator and wit
188 Ross [1980] 1 Ch 297, 322; Gartside [1983] NZLR 37, 43, 49; Hawkins II (1988) 164 CLR 539,
554, 577, 591; White [1995] 2 AC 207, 233, 239, 268, 276; Van Erp II (1997) 188 CLR 159,
167, 171, 185, 187, 196–7, 236; Carr-Glynn II [1999] Ch 326, 337; Corbett III [2001] 3 All ER
769, 772, 773; cf Heyer, 74 Cal Rptr 225, 231–2 (Cal, 1969); Bates, above n 12, 332.
189 [1980] 1 Ch 297, 322.
190 Henderson Trout II [2000] QCA 93 (Unreported, Pincus and Thomas JJA and Byrne J,
24 March 2000) [40].
191 Stanton, above n 113, 192. Cf Whittingham (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 353, 374; ‘Solicitors’ Duties’
[1997] New Zealand Law Journal 240.
192 Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743, 755, 759; Teubner v Humble (1963)
108 CLR 491, 503.
193 Cf Fleming, above n 113, 347.
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nesses;194 and alternative methods of signing.195 Ignorance of the effect of
marriage (and divorce) on a will could also not now be defended.196 However,
taking notes of instructions, having them confirmed by the client,197 and prompt
preparation of a will198 (with special urgency attached to a will for a client who
belongs to a class that presents a greater risk of early death) should minimise the
risk of the solicitor negligently failing to comply with instructions or failing to
finish the will on time. Precedent letters, either outlining the retainer or finalising
the work, can easily discharge duties like that of advising when automatic
revocation can occur.
Indeed, even duties that have puzzled commentators worried about risk man-
agement199 can be reconfigured by well-written letters of retention, a practice
allowed in Hawkins II itself.200 For example, it seems that a court could hold
both a testator and beneficiaries to an oral agreement over the time that is to be
allowed to a solicitor to prepare a will,201 and this is something that could
usefully be confirmed in a letter of retention. The possible custodial duty to take
steps to learn of a client testator’s death could be met by written advice that the
will is held on condition that the client makes arrangements for another person to
tell the solicitor of the client’s death, and that the solicitor is authorised immedi-
ately to advise the executor of his or her appointment. A letter to the executor
could likewise request that the solicitor be informed of the executor’s address.202
This helps to show that reasonable steps to learn of the testator’s death and to
advise the executor have been taken.203
Some duties are more difficult to manage. It is hazardous for a solicitor to
predict what standard of knowledge of the underlying stratum of property law is
194 Whittingham (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 353, 336.
195 Summerville [1998] NSWSC 52 (Unreported, Mason P, Sheller and Beazley JJA,
26 February 1998) 7.
196 Hall [1957] 2 QB 455, 464 suggests otherwise about legal practice in the 1940s. However, since
standard practice manuals and checklists on will-making now include advising a client on the
effect of marriage, this must now be assumed to be basic knowledge for competent solicitors:
John de Groot, Steven Karas and Julie Pastellas, Solicitors’ Checklists (2nd ed, 1993) 6. See also
the expert evidence in Sutherland [1980] 2 NZLR 536, 542.
197 Sutherland [1980] 2 NZLR 536, 539–40; Walker [1999] 1 WLR 727, 732, 735.
198 Christopher Wallworth, ‘Wills Case Reaches Lords’ (1994) 138 Solicitors Journal 223; ‘Wills
Case Effect on Claims “Not Dramatic”’, above n 4, 156. Although the testator was a septuage-
narian, the decision in White shows that a period of two months to prepare a will for a healthy
client is too long. It would probably be unwise, where the instructions for disposition are clear
and no other legalities need be settled before execution, to allow will-making to take more than a
month.
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18 Queensland Law Society Journal 95, 98; Frank Riley, ‘Holding a Client’s Will? Consider the
Duty of Care’ (1988) 26(5) Law Society Journal 47, 51.
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expected to meet the standard of care,204 and much will depend on how uncom-
mon or technical the issue is.205 However, this is a general problem of legal
practice and cannot be attributed to the development of will-making duties.
Further precautionary measures are also often taken to meet custodial duties.
Some law firms undertake daily reviews of death notices and obituaries in local
newspapers and check names against the safe-custody register, a procedure that
will obviously raise administrative costs.
However, the Henderson Trout II duty to a hopeful to prepare a will ready for
execution brings risk management to the sensitive area of client relations,
requiring the solicitor to give some direction to, and perhaps to exert some
pressure on, the testator to make up his or her mind about the disposition of the
property. To an extent, guiding a client’s wishes was already a duty. For even in
will-making, the solicitor is no mere scrivener rephrasing the testator’s wishes in
appropriate legalese.206 If the property is incapable of testamentary gift, the
solicitor should advise the testator of alternative means, if any, of dealing with
it.207 If the property is completely inalienable, the solicitor should advise that it
is not possible to give effect to the testator’s wishes.208 The testator may not like
it but, where the testator wants to exclude dependants from the estate, the
solicitor should advise that family provision laws impose ‘a moral duty’ on the
testator to make adequate provision for their dependants.209 All of this serves
clients’ interests, enabling them to use the law as best they can.
The Henderson Trout II duty raises another complication: the promotion of the
hopeful’s interests even where they do not coincide with the testator’s. The
Queensland Court of Appeal’s judgment in Henderson Trout II does not make
clear what is required of a solicitor when the duty to prepare a will expeditiously
is owed to a hopeful, as compared to White where it was owed to an intended
beneficiary. A weak interpretation is that the duty to the hopeful is a duty to urge
the testator to make a faster decision on the terms of a will and sign it, even if the
effect of that decision is to exclude the hopeful from the estate. A strong inter-
204 For example, even knowing whether and how to sever a joint tenancy is debatable. In Carr-
Glynn II [1999] Ch 326, 339, Thorpe LJ considered that the means of severance was ‘one of the
simplest procedures in an area of law where the procedures are not always simple’. At trial,
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205 So while, in England in the 1940s, knowing how to identify an entailed estate and how to
disentail it might be ‘known and understood by every solicitor’ (Otter [1953] 1 Ch 280, 285–6)
the same might not be so in modern Australian practice. On the other hand, the decision in
Lucas I, 364 P 2d 685, 690 (Cal 1961), was that an attorney need not know that a legacy is void
if it might possibly vest outside the perpetuity period. Later rationalisations in the rule against
perpetuities suggest that a competent solicitor could be expected to know more about it. In any
case, new ‘wait and see’ rules would probably mean that a gift like that in Lucas I would now be
considered valid.
206 Earl [1998] 2 WWR 522, 540.
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208 Lorraine, 467 So 2d 315, 319 (Fla 3d Dist Ct App, 1985).
209 That means that if the will does not provide enough for dependants, the testator should be aware
that the court could defeat his or her intentions by allowing a family provision claim. Further,
the size of the estate and its ability to provide for those the testator does want to benefit could be
depleted, as the estate is likely to bear a significant portion of the court costs: John de Groot and
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pretation is that it is a duty to have the testator decide to sign a will that makes
the hopeful an intended beneficiary. Either is compatible with Henderson
Trout II, although the strong interpretation conflicts with other case law that
recognises that no duty is owed to a person who is consciously excluded from an
estate.210 Indeed, where the testator’s goodwill towards the hopeful is ebbing, the
strong interpretation puts the solicitor in a position that carries a significant risk
of conflicting duties — and that, of course, is itself a breach of duty. But even
under the weak interpretation, the solicitor must assume ‘busybody functions’,211
leaning on a client to make up their mind about the disposition of the estate
merely to discharge a duty the solicitor owes to someone else. Henderson Trout
II therefore suggests that the solicitor is supposed to be caretaking for two
masters. In practice, the solicitor is more likely to serve the client and disregard
the hopeful. For, if the duty to the latter were taken seriously, the solicitor would
probably end up despised by both — like the partners in Henderson Trout II.
It would probably improve practice if the Henderson Trout II obligation were
reconsidered. For a will to have some longevity, there is often good reason to
allow the testator to deliberate carefully, consult widely and remain undecided
throughout that time.212 So long as the client is fully advised on the present
division of the estate if a new will is not executed,213 no damage is caused if the
testamentary intention remains unformed and the will unprepared. The client has
a right of indecision, and the solicitor a right to expect that undivided loyalty will
be rewarded in the courts.
210 Sutherland [1980] 2 NZLR 536; Clarke v Bruce Lance & Co (a firm) [1988] 1 All ER 364, 369–
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24 March 2000) [40].
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